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The role of Chinese migrants in Africa—when viewed from
the perspective of the agri-food sector—is poorly researched
and understood. A micro-level view suggests, however, that
it does not ﬁt neatly into Western media stereotypes (land
grabbing, empire building) or Chinese government discourses
(South–South cooperation and technology transfer). This is
not a state-driven phenomenon, but rather a story of individ-
uals. This paper aims to make an empirical contribution by
investigating—through ﬁve case studies—the role of Chinese
migrants in the agri-food sector in two African countries—
Ethiopia and Ghana. In so doing, we hope to challenge some
prevailing narratives surrounding Chinese migrants and Chi-
na’s role in Africa, and to explore the implications for local
development in these countries.*This paper was researched and written under the ‘China and Brazil in
African Agriculture’ project (www.future-agricutures.org/research/cbaa),
and supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (grant:
ES/J013420/1) under the ‘‘Rising Powers and Interdependent Futures
Programme.”. We would especially like to thank Ian Scoones and three
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and feedback.2. METHODOLOGY
Our research goal was to look beyond oﬃcial Chinese gov-
ernment proclamations, as well as the dramatic allegations that
characterize some of the media coverage of Chinese investment
in Africa, to investigate what is actually happening on the
ground. The only way to understand fully is to engage closely
with migrants through individual case studies to examine their
activities and motivations, their networks, the reasons they
ended up in Africa and in the food sector, and overall to try
to ascertain the impacts of their activities on local development.
The main methodologies used in both countries were semi-
structured interviews and participant observation. A total of
45 interviews were conducted in Ethiopia, 43 of which were
done during four periods of ﬁeldwork between November
2013 and December 2014, complemented with another two
interviews with informants based in China. Informants
included oﬃcials from the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture;61staﬀ of the China-Ethiopia Agricultural Technology Demon-
stration Centre (ATDC); instructors at Alage Agricultural
College; Chinese farmers, hotel managers, restaurant owners,
entrepreneurs, local vegetable and meat vendors; and research-
ers at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research. In
Ghana, 27 interviews were conducted during ﬁeldwork in
December 2013. Interviewees included Chinese farmers, super-
market owners, pesticide salespeople, staﬀ of the Chinese
Embassy, local farmers, local vegetable vendors, and staﬀ of
the Ghanaian Ministry of Agriculture. In addition to these
longer interviews, there was also a much larger number of
shorter interactions with Chinese, Ethiopians, and Ghanaians
involved in the production, sale, and consumption of agricul-
tural commodities. Interviews were conducted in Chinese,
English, and Amharic depending on the preference of the
informant and ease of communication.
In Ethiopia, Chinese migrants are involved in running
restaurants, several retail food businesses, and some small
farms. There is one Chinese company that has recently
acquired land to grow rice and vegetables, and at least one
other that is planning to invest in agriculture. In Ghana, the
scope of food-related activities that Chinese migrants are
involved in is much broader due to a more lenient regulatory
environment (discussed in section 6). This includes running
farms, restaurants, retail food shops, and supermarkets as well
as input supply ﬁrms. There are also Chinese companies that
grow some of their own produce for their Chinese staﬀ, and
Chinese food-processing companies producing snacks and
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sector businesses in Ghana, this paper only proﬁles a small
number of them. Furthermore, the focus of this paper is on
farms, shops, and other enterprises involved in marketing food
and agricultural products, and hence there is only passing
mention here of ﬁrms that are growing food solely for their
own staﬀ needs.
In each country, research involved multinational research
teams. In Ghana, the team included two Chinese researchers
ﬂuent in English, a Chinese speaking researcher from the
UK, and a Ghanaian university professor ﬂuent in English.
In Ethiopia, the team was comprised of a Chinese speaking
American and an Ethiopian researcher from a government
institute ﬂuent in English and Amharic. The teams attempted
to locate Chinese farmers and migrants involved in other parts
of the food industry by triangulating between Investment
Agency lists, regional tours conducted by local research
assistants and ad hoc investigations, based on snowball sam-
pling.3. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING CHINESE
MIGRATION TO AFRICA
China is playing an inﬂuential role in the development path
of African countries and its inﬂuence on the continent will
continue to grow in tandem with rising trade and aid ﬂows
(Amanor & Chichava, 2016). Most of the literature on
China–Africa relations focuses on state-level cooperation, as
well as Chinese state-owned ﬁrms, which operate in tandem
with state institutions and policy (Gu, Zhang, Mukwereza,
& Amanor, 2016). However, there are also large numbers of
Chinese migrants in Africa who are participating in local
economies in various ways. What these people are doing,
and the inﬂuence they are having on local development, is only
recently beginning to be addressed in the literature (e.g.,
French, 2014; Mohan, Lampert, Tan-Mullins, & Chang,
2014), but the role of Chinese migrants in the agri-food sector
is a neglected area. This section draws on the literature to
explore what we know about Chinese migration trends in
Africa, and to highlight the gaps.(a) Migration trends and data gaps
The outward ﬂow of Chinese migrants is a function of
changes in China’s political economic context. For the ﬁrst
three decades following the founding of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) in 1949, China’s migration was tightly con-
trolled. People either left the country to work on state-
backed projects in developing countries abroad, or they left
illegally (Fielding, 2015). In order to foster diplomatic rela-
tions with newly independent African states, Mao sent an esti-
mated 150,000 workers and technicians to Africa to
participate in agriculture, technology, and infrastructure pro-
jects, the vast majority of whom returned to China after com-
pleting their work (Park, 2009, p. 2). The 1978 reform and
opening up period initially saw the gradual legal migration
of researchers and students to Western universities and the
illegal migration of largely poor people from Southeast China
to North America and Western Europe. As economic growth
continued, migration ﬂows increased too and took on a global
character as people moved to other parts of Asia, Latin Amer-
ica, and Africa. Although Chinese people have been going to
Africa on state-to-state cooperation projects since the incep-
tion of the PRC in 1949 (Amanor & Chichava, 2016), it is onlysince the beginning of the 21st century that mainland Chinese
have begun to migrate to Africa independently in signiﬁcant
numbers (Fielding, 2015).
Chinese migration to Ethiopia and Ghana has increased sig-
niﬁcantly in recent years, as Chinese companies have
expanded their presence in the mining, construction, road
building, hydropower, electricity, railroad, telecommunica-
tions, manufacturing, and other sectors. Data on the number
of Chinese migrants in Africa are incomplete and unreliable,
and these two countries are no exception. A source in the
Ethiopian Embassy in Beijing indicated that there are
35,000–40,000 Chinese people living in Ethiopia. 1 A contact
in the Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa put that number at
20,000. 2
As for Ghana, Mohan et al. (2014, pp. 20–21) estimate Chi-
nese migrant numbers at anywhere between 7,000 and 20,000.
They quote another source that puts this ﬁgure at between
6,000 and 10,000 (Marfaing & Thiel, 2011). However, The
Guardian reported that 4,592 illegal Chinese gold miners were
deported in June–July 2013 alone, 3 which indicates that the
total number of Chinese migrants in Ghana is considerably
higher than the other estimates. Previous studies of Chinese
migrations to Ghana also chart the ﬂow of people coming
from Hong Kong (or through Hong Kong from mainland
China) from the 1950s to 1970s, often setting up textile mills
(Ho, 2008). Movements of Chinese migrants are not uni-
directional in time or space, with migrants moving between
countries and also splitting their time between countries in a
highly ﬂexible way. Additional factors include porous borders
within Africa, corruption, and ineﬀectiveness within agencies
responsible for border control and immigration. For these rea-
sons, accurate ﬁgures on the Chinese presence in Africa are
diﬃcult to obtain and constantly in ﬂux (Park, 2012).
Since the promulgation of China’s Going Out Strategy in
1999, the Chinese government has been actively promoting
the outward ﬂow of companies and people, including in the
agricultural sector. This has taken the form of general encour-
agement to Chinese companies that they should invest in Afri-
can agriculture, 4 as well as state-to-state cooperation projects
that bring in Chinese companies 5 (Gu et al., 2016). There have
also been increasing numbers of Chinese researchers and civil
servants recommending that Chinese state agencies do more to
facilitate the ‘‘going out” of Chinese companies into African
agriculture (Jing & Li, 2011). And there have been reports
of studies for the Chinese government that African agriculture
could provide employment for up to 1 million Chinese labor-
ers, and aid China’s food security (Bezlova, 2009).
Several studies over the past decade have begun to look at
the nature of Chinese migration across diﬀerent African coun-
tries. These have given great insights into the diversity of
actors, how they engage with local communities, as well as
the push and pull factors which brought them to Africa in
the ﬁrst place (Mohan et al., 2014; Guo Chatelard & Chu,
2014; Bra¨utigam, 2011). Between them, they show how Chi-
nese migrants already engage in numerous forms of business,
ranging from construction to trading and healthcare. Many
of the migrants who have set up small businesses in Africa
originally came over on large state-to-state projects, but family
connections are now becoming more important, both in terms
of bringing people out in the ﬁrst place, as well as the function-
ing of businesses over time (Mohan et al., 2014).
There are however very few studies focusing speciﬁcally on
Chinese migrants’ engagement in the agri-food sector in Afri-
can countries. A notable exception is recent work on Chinese
agricultural engagements in Zambia (Guo Chatelard & Chu,
2014), which has a particular focus on individual, private
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complemented by another study from Zambia that traces the
evolution of Chinese participation in Zambian agriculture
from ‘‘agro-socialist” to ‘‘agro-capitalist” modes, and includes
the role of Chinese commercial farmers (Yan & Sautman,
2010). While these studies deal exclusively with farms and
not food sector businesses, Zambia provides an interesting
contrast to Ethiopia and Ghana, particularly given the larger
number of Chinese farmers there. A number of other studies
have also touched upon Chinese migrant farming operations,
as part of broader investigations into Chinese agricultural
engagements (e.g., Bra¨utigam & Tang, 2012; Dobler, 2005;
French, 2014). Our ﬁeldwork in Ethiopia and Ghana builds
upon these studies, while adding a comparative element that
aims to highlight points of continuity and discontinuity across
countries and sectors.4. CHINESE MIGRANTS IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
Agricultural cooperation between China and African coun-
tries dates back to the 1960s, and has evolved in the decades
since in tandem with changes in China’s political economy
(Amanor & Chichava, 2016; Tang, Li, & Qi, 2014). The model
of large Chinese state-owned farms in the 1960s has since mor-
phed into a mixture of aid, South–South cooperation and
investment (Bra¨utigam & Tang, 2009). In terms of oﬃcial
cooperation between China and Ethiopia, there is a China-
Ethiopia Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre
(ATDC) in Ginchi (Xu, Li, Qi, Tang, & Mukwereza, 2016),
Chinese instructors are teaching at agricultural vocational col-
leges, Chinese agronomists are participating in FAO and other
agricultural development projects, and Chinese experts are
serving with the Ministry of Agriculture (Alemu, 2013;
Alemu, Cook, & Qi, 2015). In Ghana, areas of agricultural
cooperation have included irrigation, agro-processing, agricul-
tural technology, infrastructure development, as well as the
provision of Chinese agricultural experts to teach at the
University of Ghana (Amanor, 2013).
Just as the information on Chinese migrants is patchy and
unreliable, data on Chinese investment in the agricultural sec-
tor are incomplete and often inaccurate. For instance, spread-
sheets obtained from the Ethiopian Investment Agency in
March 2014 listed 39 Chinese investments in the agricultural
sector in the period between October 1995 and December
2013. However, most of the phone numbers and email
addresses of the contacts for these investments were no longer
valid, and so their existence was impossible to conﬁrm. Visits
to the locations of some of these notional investments showed
nothing on the ground. Several informants conﬁrmed that
many of these investments exist only on paper.
Despite a signiﬁcant record of Chinese engagement in agri-
culture and rural development in Ethiopia since oﬃcial diplo-
matic relations between the two nations began in 1970, there
appear to be very few actual Chinese farms in Ethiopia, and
none of them large scale. These ﬁndings are consistent with
Bra¨utigam and Tang (2012), who found only one such farm.
Our attempts to contact the Chinese investors listed revealed
only two commercially operating farms: a 1-ha chicken farm
called the Joy River Meat Company located in Butajira about
130 km from Addis Ababa, and a 10-ha vegetable farm located
about 60 km outside of the capital. On the other hand, one
large Chinese company we contacted in Ethiopia (CGC Over-
seas) is considering investments in the agricultural sector, and a
second company (Sino Trust Investments Co.) is already in the
early stages of investing in rice and vegetable production.The situation in Ghana is similar. Data obtained from the
Ghanaian Investment Promotion Centre in December 2013
listed 12 Chinese farms. However this list was inaccurate, as
a number of operations could not be conﬁrmed, and one
vegetable farm was identiﬁed that was not listed. Some large
Chinese companies such as China Geo, Sinohydro and China
Railway Engineering Corporation have their own small veg-
etable and pig farms geared toward meeting the consumption
needs of their own staﬀ. 6 However, these are also not listed in
the Ghanaian Investment Promotion Centre records. The
main Chinese investments in Ghana’s agricultural sector are
in the provision of infrastructure, technical services, and input
supplies (Amanor, 2013).
Agribusiness engagements—whether farms, input suppliers,
or other agri-food value chain businesses—remain scarce. Chi-
nese initiatives in agricultural production have tended to
develop as sidelines to infrastructure developments (Amanor,
2013). Indeed, the only large-scale agricultural investment
our ﬁeldwork encountered was a construction company that
was bidding for part of a 10,000-ha plot of land in the north
of Ghana to grow rice. It was competing against a Brazilian
ﬁrm that was interested in investing in the entire area, and
at the time of research there was no decision as to which com-
pany, if any, would win the bid (see Amanor & Chichava,
2016). 7
This dearth of farming activity is perhaps surprising in light
of the total number of Chinese migrants in Ethiopia and
Ghana. Many more Chinese migrants go into other sectors
such as mining (particularly in Ghana), commerce, manufac-
turing, energy, construction, engineering, railroads, road
building, telecoms and hydropower, often as part of larger
commercial, state-backed investments. In fact, farming
appears to be a relatively neglected sector for the Chinese in
Africa generally, in spite of Western media and NGO reports
of ‘‘land grabs”. 8 Even in Zambia, where there are about half
a dozen Chinese state-owned farms and approximately 30 Chi-
nese private farms, ‘‘Chinese farms on the whole remain rela-
tively small players in Zambia’s evolving agricultural sector”
(Guo Chatelard, 2014, p. 3). Moreover, all of those farms
are geared toward meeting domestic demand rather than for
export. Our research only found one export-oriented ﬁrm: a
Qingdao-based Chinese enterprise with a processing plant in
Addis Ababa that is exporting sesame back to China. The ﬁrm
does not have a farm, but instead buys from local growers.
In the following section we oﬀer two detailed proﬁles of
Chinese farmers in Ethiopia and Ghana, which illustrate the
small-scale, marginal and rather haphazard nature of Chinese
investment in the agricultural sector in both countries, as well
as its targeting of a Chinese rather than a local clientele.
(a) Case 1: a reluctant farmer in Ethiopia 9
Tao 10 came to Ethiopia with his Chinese girlfriend, now
wife, when they ﬁnished school at 19 years old. He is now
24 and they farm a 10-ha plot of land located an hour outside
of Addis Ababa. We were greeted by two local farm workers
who took us to meet Tao. He strode over to meet us and
seemed very happy to take a break from his farm duties. He
spoke ﬂuent English and mentioned that he was very proud
of this given that he ﬁnished his education after high school.
He showed us around his small farm, half of which was
overgrown with tall grass as he had not decided what to plant.
The other 5 ha of the farm was divided into three sections
planted to Chinese vegetables. By the entrance of the farm
was a metal shack where he slept whenever he did not want
to drive back to his ﬂat in the local town, 30 min away. He
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give birth. The farm was leased for Tao’s wife by her father
when he came to Ethiopia in search of business opportunities.
Tao’s father-in-law had set up a textile mill and accrued
enough capital to be able to invest in this agricultural venture
run by his daughter and son-in-law. The lease was taken over
from an Indian investor who had failed to do much with the
land, and who was found by Tao’s father-in-law through a
contact with the Ethiopian Investment Agency.
The original goal was to grow mandarin oranges, and they
hired Chinese agricultural experts from Sichuan in 2011 to
do so, but the venture failed. Tao joked that ‘‘they were clearly
not the experts they said they were!”. After a year, all Chinese
staﬀ except one went back to China. Today Tao and his wife
grow vegetables—mainly Chinese radishes and cabbage—the
seeds of which came from South Korea (picked up by his
father-in-law while traveling there on business). He mainly sells
to other Chinese and takes orders over the phone. He claims he
has an advantage over many local growers when selling to the
Chinese construction companies, because construction groups
can only work in the dry season and are generally back home in
the wet season. Although the dry season is also the hardest time
to grow vegetables, he is able to overcome this because he has
an irrigation system on his farm. He also takes produce into
Addis Ababa once a week to sell in the Rwanda Market.
The farm employs four local farm workers, whom Tao con-
sults (as well as neighboring Ethiopian farmers) on questions
about Ethiopian climates or contexts. As Tao related to us:
We knew nothing about farming before I came here. . . We grew up in
Chengdu and never even went to a farm in China. . . We learnt every-
thing from Baidu and Google! At ﬁrst my radishes came out looking
like ginseng roots, so I searched on Baidu for more information. It sug-
gested I till the ground better before planting the seeds and now my
radishes grow very well. . . I mainly grow radishes now because it’s
the only thing I can grow well! 11
Tao apparently has good relations with other local farmers
and sometimes engages with the local farmers’ union. How-
ever, he said he does not involve himself in local politics and
spoke with astonishment about how one nearby village burnt
down a neighboring village over a feud.
Like other Chinese farmers we interviewed in both coun-
tries, he had not received any help from the Chinese govern-
ment or the Chinese Embassy. Tao says his farm is not very
proﬁtable, and is currently able to persist in agriculture mainly
because of backing from his wife’s father. He admits he dis-
likes farming as it involves too much work, and yearns to give
up agriculture for a more lucrative and less isolated trade
based in the capital.
Tao’s lack of agricultural experience prior to starting this
farm is common (though not universal) among the Chinese
farmers we met in both countries, and something that Guo
Chatelard and Chu (2015) also observed in Zambia. His dislike
of farming and determination to leave the agricultural sector for
a more lucrative trade are also notable, and echo the life history
of DavidHuang, one of the earliest Chinese farmers in Ethiopia
(see Bra¨utigamandTang, 2012, p. 15), who returned toChina in
2013 to take a job with a Shenyang-based company. Clearly,
migration patterns are not a one-way street—many Chinese
migrants decide to return to China after a few years in Africa,
and people shuttle back and forth, as in Tao’s wife for giving
birth, and his father-in-law for his textile business.
For Chinese migrants in both countries, farming does not
appear to be an attractive profession for the long term. The
next farmer proﬁled in Case 2 may be an exception in this
regard, although he too illustrates the often circuitous route
taken by Chinese migrants in both countries when investingin the agri-food sector, as well as their typical focus on a Chi-
nese clientele.
(b) Case 2: from Saipan to rural Ghana
Mr. Wang is a man in his 50s with a weary look of someone
who has been through a lot. He said he left China around the
time of the Cultural Revolution (but did not want to talk about
speciﬁcs), and had originally moved to the island of Saipan in
the middle of the Paciﬁc Ocean. He certainly does not represent
the typical migration pattern of Chinese migrants in Africa, but
he had clearly maintained good networks as he was surrounded
by Chinese migrants who had come straight from China and
were partners of his in this vegetable farming enterprise.
When he ﬁrst arrived in Ghana in 2005, he surveyed ﬁve dif-
ferent plots of land before choosing his current two hectare
plot. He set up his farm that same year, having agreed to rent
it for ten years at a total cost of USD $30,000. He negotiated
with the local chief rather than the local government for this
land, explaining that although Ghanaian land laws are very
vague, he is conﬁdent his title deeds are secure. When Wang
ﬁrst arrived, he found customers by walking around the center
of Accra, approaching Chinese people and asking if they were
interested in buying vegetables. Over time, he and his partners
have built up a list of 60 customers who order food deliveries
from them over the phone. Selling directly to customers makes
his vegetables cheaper than those in the Chinese supermarkets;
however they are still too expensive for most Ghanaian cus-
tomers. Furthermore, despite not having received any direct
support from the Chinese government, the Chinese Embassy
is now one of the farm’s customers.
As a result of selling mainly to Chinese customers, Mr.
Wang and his partners do not depend on Ghanaian networks
as much as other vendors might. However, they still need to
maintain good relations with the local chief regarding their
use of the land, and the farm employs 12 local laborers.
According to Mr. Wang, and the other managers of the small
Chinese farms in Ghana that we visited, they were able to
attract and retain local workers by paying wages on time,
and sometimes in advance in order to meet workers’ urgent
social needs. Generating employment for local workers and
the timely and ﬂexible payment of wages can be seen as a pos-
itive contribution that these Chinese farms are making to the
local economy, while also contributing new and diverse agri-
cultural products to the local markets.(c) The reality of Chinese migrant farmers in Africa
These case study farms, as well as other farms run by Chinese
migrants in both countries, stand in contrast to oﬃcial Chinese
rhetoric of China–Africa agricultural cooperation, which
focuses on China’s modernized agricultural sector, advanced
techniques and mechanized large-scale farming practices. The
rather rudimentary farming methods that prevail in these small
farms are similar to smallholder farming practices in China,
and primarily consist of using organic manure for fertilizer,
manual labor and a greater reliance on natural resources than
on modern machinery and technology. There is little chance of
these farms becoming large-scale, highly mechanized or capital
intensive. Their production is not for export but entirely
focused on meeting the needs of a local niche market, which
consists primarily of Chinese (and other Asian) customers.
Relatively few Chinese migrants to Ghana and Ethiopia
have taken the path of Tao and Wang though. What then
explains the small number of Chinese farms? Informants in
both countries oﬀered similar explanations. As the head of a
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agriculture in the country for over ﬁve years explained,
‘‘agriculture requires a sustained eﬀort, one or two years are
not enough. In addition, Ghana has land (tenure) problems.
If you start farming in a careless manner, later you may face
lawsuits”. 12 The owner of a Chinese restaurant in Addis
Ababa touched upon many of the same issues:
In the past there were Chinese people involved in growing vegetables, but
it's difﬁcult and tiring work, and doesn't make much money. Chinese inves-
tors are looking for a quicker return. Locals are also afraid that too many
Chinese will come here, and invest too much money. 13
He also mentioned that establishing a farm requires dealing
with the government, and that ‘‘Chinese people don’t like to
have to deal with so much trouble, and so they don’t bother.”
Land issues appear to be major obstacles to Chinese farmers in
both countries; both because of the diﬃculty of locating suit-
able land, and land tenure complications once a plot is
selected. Other reasons include poor rural infrastructure and
better opportunities in other sectors. In the case of farms,
the majority were established by individuals with little or no
previous farming experience. They learned by trial and error,
and many were not successful. In fact, farmers we interviewed
in Ghana contended that far more Chinese farms failed than
succeeded. Those who remain in the sector are the survivors,
and they face the constant challenge of securing land rights. 14
In addition to these factors, there are larger issues of risk
and competitiveness that may be restricting Chinese invest-
ment in African agriculture. As a leading economist with
China Exim Bank observes, ‘‘market volatility represents a
major risk for Chinese investment in African agriculture”
(cited in Buckley, 2013, p. 15). The same informant also
observed that another challenge is competition with Western
agribusiness operators: ‘‘Chinese companies are still in the
early stage of global supply chain management, so are not able
to compete with Western companies” (Buckley, 2013, p. 17).
Market risk and competition are two factors that all entrepre-
neurs have to face; in the next section we turn our attention to
the struggles of Chinese entrepreneurs in the agri-food sector
as they try to move up the value chain.5. CHINESE MIGRANTS IN AFRICA’S AGRI-FOOD
VALUE CHAINS
In contrast to the stereotype of the successful Chinese entre-
preneur in Africa (Mohan et al., 2014), many Chinese
migrants in the agri-food sector in both countries struggle to
make a living amidst considerable hardship, whether in farm-
ing, retail or trading. Even where successful, migrants have
had to overcome signiﬁcant obstacles, as the following three
case studies illustrate.
(a) Case 3: selling vegetables in Addis Ababa
Ms. Tang is an energetic 24-year old from Dalian in Liaon-
ing Province who runs a vegetable shop in Addis Ababa. Her
shop is on the edge of the Rwanda Market, which is the pri-
mary market in Addis for Chinese companies and restaurants
to obtain meat and Chinese vegetables for their kitchens. She
sources her vegetables from the Agricultural Technology
Demonstration Centre as well as local growers. Ms. Tang’s
shop is medium sized and minimally decorated, with large bur-
lap sacks on the ﬂoor near the front entrance overﬂowing with
carrots, eggplant, potatoes, peppers and other vegetables. Bins
full of every conceivable kind of Chinese vegetable line thewalls of the shop. Business is brisk, as is clear from the trucks
constantly pulling up outside to buy her vegetables, tofu and
pork. Most of her customers are large Chinese ﬁrms doing
business in Ethiopia, as well as some restaurants. The Chinese
companies buy in bulk for their cafeterias, as Chinese vegeta-
bles are not available from most markets. ‘‘There are more
and more Chinese here,” she says, ‘‘so business is good”. 15
But she also complains about the restrictions on doing busi-
ness in Ethiopia, theft by local people, as well as arbitrary
tax and legal rules. ‘‘The legal system here is not well devel-
oped. The tax system is not sound. This country didn’t even
have a proper customs (system) ten years ago!” 16
On the other hand, an oﬃcial we interviewed at the Ministry
of Trade conﬁrmed that Ethiopian regulations do not allow
foreigners to engage in any wholesaling and retailing activities,
and the ministry is not aware of the procedures that Ms. Tang
followed to operate her vegetable retailing business. In fact,
the few Chinese shop owners in Ethiopia go into business with
local partners, who obtain the business license on their behalf.
She has had her shop closed three times by the authorities and
faces frequent visits from government inspectors who she
claims are trying to supplement their meagre incomes by
imposing ﬁnes.
(b) Case 4: building an input supply business in Ghana
Chinese engagements in wider agri-food value chains
include not only the production, sale and processing of agri-
cultural products, but also the supply of inputs. Agrochemi-
cals have become an important business opportunity,
particularly in Ghana (Yu, Lu, Tugendhat, & Li, 2015).
Ms. Yao works for her family business, ‘‘Five Continents”,
set up by her father in Ghana in 2006. They currently have two
family members in Accra (her and her brother) and another
two in Kumasi, all selling agrochemical products (pesticides
and fertilizers) bought from manufacturers in China. Their
father set up the company because he had heard that agro-
chemicals could be sold tax-free in Ghana. However, their
business has been suﬀering lately from increased competition
with Ghanaian traders who are now increasingly buying
straight from the manufacturers in China.
Ms. Yao asked why the Chinese state did not oﬀer more
support to Chinese entrepreneurs abroad. She explained:
Our proﬁt margins are roughly 5 per cent and the exchange rates are not
stable. It is impossible to convert Cedi directly to RMB, you have to con-
vert into US dollars ﬁrst. And since the Cedi has declined in value lately,
more and more Chinese traders in leather, shoes, small goods, etc. have
been forced to close up and move back to China. But at least there are
no restrictions on quantities of currency we can take home. 17
Life is clearly tough as they have virtually no social interac-
tions in Accra outside of work. She told us she overcame this
by reconnecting with school friends over the Internet lately.
She also told us that:
Recently there has been more antagonism toward Chinese citizens in Ghana
since the Chinese gold miners were kicked out. This is especially so up in
Kumasi where the miners were operating and is also home to the largest
agricultural chemicals market. Nowadays I don't stay out late, whereas be-
fore it was safer. 18
Ms. Yao has a good relationship with her Ghanaian neigh-
bors and her business would not have functioned without local
partners. We met in the shop opposite their oﬃce, and were
oﬀered drinks by the shop-owners as her guests. Five Conti-
nents products were displayed at the entrance of the shop that
would normally have just sold daily necessities such as sham-
poo, newspapers and soft drinks. The only other place Five
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main marketplaces in Accra, operated by two Ghanaians on
their behalf. We sat round a table to the side of the shop—
her relationship with the shop owners suggested this was a
normal place for her to meet people that came on business.
Ms. Yao’s operation is in stark contrast to the highly suc-
cessful Chinese agrochemicals group, Wynca Sunshine. Wynca
Sunshine entered the Ghanaian market a decade ago, and is
now the largest company of its kind, having surpassed the for-
merly dominant British and Israeli companies in terms of mar-
ket share. 19 With Ghana as its hub in West Africa, the
company now distributes to Nigeria, Mali, and Coˆte d’Ivoire,
with a view to expanding further. It is also the ﬁrst overseas
agrochemical ﬁrm to have established its own bottling plant
in Ghana, employing roughly 100 staﬀ. In Wynca Sunshine,
Ms. Yao sees potential for her business, but she admits she
has a way to go.
(c) Case 5: two restauranteurs in Ethiopia
Many migrants were originally attached to large companies,
and later branched out on their own once they became aware
of the opportunities this sector oﬀered. For example, Mr. Fu,
a short, stocky 44-year old from Dujiangyan in Sichuan Pro-
vince, was a former cook in an aeronautics company. He
was sent by his ﬁrm to Dubai before being transferred to
Ethiopia. After half a year at his ﬁrm in Ethiopia, he left to
start his own business selling pork and fresh ﬁsh. He claims
to be the only person in Addis Ababa who sells live ﬁsh. Later
on he also opened his own restaurant specializing in fresh ﬁsh
and Lanzhou style dishes. Mr. Fu works closely with local
brokers (delalas) who link him to anything he needs to obtain,
including house and car rental, hiring of workers, suppliers of
live ﬁsh, etc. Moreover, he was able to ensure his stay and
operate his own business through his marriage to an Ethiopian
woman that was also facilitated by a delala. 20 His local wife
obtained the business license allowing him to operate legally.
Through Mr. Fu we met Mr. Li, a former truck driver in his
40s from Jilin province. Mr. Li is a balding, burly man with a
dark complexion and a ready smile. He came to Ethiopia in
February 2014 on an invitation from Mr. Fu, who knew a
friend of his in China. Mr. Fu needed help with his live ﬁsh
shop, and also to start his new restaurant. At the time, the
two had never met, and only saw each other in person for
the ﬁrst time when Li arrived in Addis. By September 2014,
Li had already started his own hot pot restaurant not far from
Mr. Fu’s venue. In explaining his decision to come to Ethiopia
and to enter the food sector, Li observed that: ‘‘China doesn’t
have many blank spaces, whereas here there are many”. 21
What he meant was that virtually every business opportunity
in China has already been exploited, whereas in Africa there
are ample untapped opportunities waiting to be developed.6. DISCUSSION
What then do these ﬁve cases tell us about the contributions
of Chinese migrants to the African agri-food sector in two
countries? How can then they help separate facts from ﬁction?
Popular representations in the Western media concerning Chi-
na’s expanding presence in Africa often suggest that China is
building a new empire on the continent. One example of this
imperial narrative and the role of Chinese migrants within it
is given in Cardenal and Arau´jo (2013, p. 5):
China's expansion would not be what it is today without the support of mil-
lions of anonymous people who brave prejudice and uncertainty to set upbusinesses in the most unlikely places around the planet. China beneﬁts
from an army of astonishing human beings with a limitless capacity for
self-sacriﬁce, who venture out into the world driven only by their dreams
of success and who go to conquer impossible markets Westerners never
dared to tackle—or if they did, they failed.
While Cardenal and Arau´jo (2013, p. xiii) speak of ‘‘a silent
army” of ‘‘tireless entrepreneurs” who are venturing to the
African continent and other places to conquer new markets,
Chinese government narratives point instead to possibilities
for ‘‘South–South cooperation” and generating ‘‘win–win”
solutions to problems of development in Africa. Speciﬁcally
in the agri-food sector, Chinese oﬃcial discourses stress the
capacity of Chinese technology to raise agricultural productiv-
ity and enhance food security in Africa (Buckley, 2013).
What we observed on the ground matches none of the nar-
ratives surrounding the Chinese in Africa. Far from being a
‘‘silent army” promoting China’s interests in Africa, Chinese
migrants in the agri-food sector in Ethiopia and Ghana are
mostly independent actors with little or no support from or
even contact with the Chinese government. They serve no lar-
ger agenda and are simply trying to eke out a living and make
a proﬁt under often arduous circumstances. Most end up in
this sector by circumstance rather than by pre-determined
plan, and many fail along the way. Nor do they necessarily
end up staying in Africa permanently, as quite a few eventually
return to China.
While there are some exceptions, the majority of the
migrants in our study are not particularly wealthy, yet com-
pared to China, Africa is still seen as a place of opportunity.
(a) Africa as opportunity
The theme of ‘‘Africa as opportunity”, also highlighted by
Mohan et al. (2014), is as true of Ethiopia and Ghana as any-
where else in Africa. For many migrants, Africa oﬀers them
prospects that do not exist back in China. As the vegetable
shop owner Ms. Tang put it: ‘‘I have a lot of opportunities
here. Maybe in a few years I can go to the UK, or to another
country. I haven’t thought of returning to China. If I returned,
I would just have to ﬁnd a job”. 22 Ms. Tang moved to Ethio-
pia two years ago at the request of a friend in the construction
business who needed her help. Now she is already a successful
entrepreneur running her own business, whereas in China she
would have to work for someone else. Many Chinese migrants
tend to come to Ethiopia and Ghana for other kinds of work,
but end up in the agri-food sector after seeing the opportuni-
ties it oﬀers. Most of our informants in farming had no expe-
rience in that sector; they learned by doing, or from the
Internet.
Several of our informants got into the agri-food sector
because local food markets could not meet the demand for
Chinese vegetables. In Ghana, the main local staples are cas-
sava, yam, cocoyam, and plantain, which are unfamiliar to
the Chinese. In the past there were very limited types of veg-
etables available for the Chinese community, and this gap in
local markets inspired Chinese entrepreneurs to start growing
and selling vegetables. It is this combination of increased
demand and promising business opportunities, coupled with
entrepreneurial initiative on the part of Chinese migrants, that
has resulted in the growth of food sector businesses in Ghana
and Ethiopia. Another factor may be the competitive advan-
tage they have in Africa given their connections with China
and their skills in specialized cooking (in the case of restauran-
teurs) and food production. An example of the latter are the
tofu producers in Ethiopia, who have cornered the market
on a specialty item.
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the market waiting to be exploited as a pull factor for moving
to Africa, along with the fact that it does not require much
capital to start a business. These combined with the push fac-
tor of tough competition back home. As a hotel manager in
Addis Ababa observed: ‘‘in China it’s very diﬃcult to do busi-
ness. The market there is already saturated”. 23 This is a sen-
timent that we heard again and again. As another Chinese
entrepreneur lamented:
In China's domestic market, pressure is intense, and so (we) choose the for-
eign market. Because with Chinese, the ideas you have, have already been
implemented by others. You can only choose those areas where you are
stronger or more advanced than others, otherwise you will fail. Competition
at home is too intense, and there's no shortage of hands because mechaniza-
tion has replaced human labor. The market is already saturated. 24
Other migrants came to Africa with family members. As one
young Chinese farmer from a Hunanese family related to us:
My father was an engineer repairing machinery in a Ghanaian enterprise,
and my mother and I also stayed here. I studied in Ghana until graduation
from high school. I planned to go to the UK for college, but I gave up be-
cause we could not afford to pay the high tuition fees. Then I took over the
business from my parents. Before the farm, they had run a Chinese restau-
rant. 25
For this young farmer, he had not chosen to come to
Ghana, but he did choose to stay and help with the family
business.
For some informants, the main motivation for going to
Africa was simply the desire to make money. As one Chinese
entrepreneur in Ethiopia put it, ‘‘frankly speaking, I’m here to
make money. (We) go wherever money can be made”. 26 For
those migrants with families, this is not simply for oneself,
but rather to support one’s family and improve their economic
circumstances. This often entails frequent travel back
and forth between China and Africa. For these migrants,
‘‘potential short- and medium-term ﬁnancial gains appear
to outweigh very real dangers and diﬃculties” (Park, 2009,
p. 15).
However, for many migrants it is not merely a question of
making money. The theme of wanting to go out to improve
oneself, to see the wider world, came up repeatedly in conver-
sations with Chinese migrants, just as has been noted by other
studies of Chinese migrants in Africa (e.g., French, 2014;
Mohan et al., 2014). As one informant commented:
The ﬁrst reason (for going out) is that we've already been in China a long
time. Second, we hope to go outside China to improve ourselves and so
sought an opportunity. It's rare to be able to go outside China with an oppor-
tunity of this kind; some opportunities come by chance, not by seeking, you
just happen upon them. It's not like you can go just because you want to. 27
Across our informants, there was a large diversity of
migrant pathways, and chains of arrival. In many ways every
story was diﬀerent. What is clear however is that the growing
numbers of Chinese migrants in Africa reﬂect the fact that
many people want to leave China, as they have for centuries.
A combination of push and pull factors are now providing
people with opportunities to go to Africa, and many are tak-
ing those opportunities. However, the process is very rarely
calculated and clear, whether at the highest level of ‘‘going
out” policymakers, or at the individual level of the migrants
described here. As the last quote indicates, it is a combination
of agency on the part of migrants and pure chance interacting
in complex and unpredictable ways that brings these migrants
to Africa.
Much is dependent on networks—both for arrival, but also
for subsequent success. Studies of Chinese migrants (e.g.,Dobler, 2005; Mohan & Kale, 2007; Ong, 1993) have noted
that family ties lie at the core of transnational networks
among the Chinese diaspora. Kinship ties are clearly also
key for many Chinese migrants in Ethiopia and Ghana in
the operation of their food sector businesses. Whether they
are in the restaurant sector, in retail or in farming, Chinese
migrants in Ghana and Ethiopia rely on their social net-
works—known as guanxi in Chinese—to do business. These
networks can take the form of kinship relations (xueyuan
guanxi), regional aﬃnities (diyuan guanxi), friendships or work
colleagues.
In China class lines are more clearly drawn, and people tend
to socialize with those of similar means, whereas in Africa
social relations are more ﬂuid because everyone is thrown
together in the same Chinese diaspora community. In this con-
text, food becomes an important means for Chinese to connect
with each other and strengthen the bonds among the diaspora
community. For instance, food markets are places for Chinese
people from diﬀerent backgrounds to meet and make connec-
tions. Chinese farmers also give specialty foods, which are
scarce commodities in Africa, to companies or to people in
the Chinese Embassy as gifts to foster friendly ties and build
their social networks.(b) Unoﬃcial business: Chinese migrants’ interactions with the
Chinese Embassy
By being mostly small-scale and ‘‘under the radar”, Chinese
migrant-run enterprises in the agriculture and food sectors in
both Ethiopia and Ghana remain outside the context of oﬃ-
cial bilateral cooperation. Even where they have contact with
the Chinese Embassy, none of our informants reported receiv-
ing any signiﬁcant support from the Chinese government and
instead rely entirely on their own resources. As the owner of a
Chinese restaurant put it:
A small business like this one is hardly worth mentioning. For large scale
investments, the government has to get involved. The government doesn't
have the time to get involved in small scale enterprises—they don't have
time, so business people have to rely solely on their own resources. Of
course, in case of trouble, we have to go to the Embassy! 28
While Chinese businesses in the food and agriculture sector
appear not to have received any direct aid from the Chinese
government, the presence of the Embassy does exercise some
inﬂuence, simply because of China’s powerful status in Africa.
As one informant pointed out:
Imperceptibly, there is a kind of help. If there wasn't an Embassy, then your
restaurant wouldn't be in a good position. Because of foreign policies. . .rel-
atively speaking, China is a big and strong country, and people outside may
respect Chinese people more (for this reason), just like with America.
Whether or not there is any help (from the Embassy), imperceptibly, there
is a kind of inﬂuence. 29
And Embassy personnel are often well known and con-
nected. Food again becomes the link. Restaurant owners are
particularly familiar with Embassy personnel, who often
patronize their establishments. As one restaurant owner
observed:
Embassy people come here, so I know them. After all, we are all Chinese
people. As Chinese, the Embassy are leaders and they are responsible for
us, and the Embassy is concerned about what we are doing here, and hope
that we are doing our business well. 30
In this sense, if Chinese businesses are doing well and abid-
ing by locals laws, it reﬂects well on the Embassy; if not, it
reﬂects poorly upon them.
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While none of our informants have received support from
the Chinese government, they are nonetheless aﬀected by gov-
ernment regulatory frameworks in African countries and their
activities are shaped accordingly. However, the regulatory pol-
icy environment is very diﬀerent in the two countries, and this
has implications for the livelihood strategies of Chinese
migrants. In Ghana, the links between production, retail and
restaurants are much more developed, and this relates to the
diﬀerent forms of engagement and the diﬀerent regulatory
environment. While there are many Chinese shops (both
wholesale and retail) in large cities in Ghana—including super-
markets run by entrepreneurs who also run farms—this is not
the case in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government restricts the
operation of retail and wholesale businesses by foreigners,
and these regulations are enforced, at least to some extent.
This is in line with Ethiopia’s commitment to a ‘‘developmen-
tal state” approach, whereby foreign investment and donor
support are carefully channeled and controlled to meet devel-
opment objectives (Alemu and Scoones, 2013; Kelsall, 2013).
The regulations on retail and wholesale business are not direc-
ted at Chinese investors speciﬁcally, but rather at carving out
an exclusive space for domestic businesses in the context of
expanding foreign investment in the country. However, they
have the eﬀect of restricting certain forms of Chinese invest-
ment, which in turn is having an impact on the manner in
which commercial relations between Chinese and Ethiopians
are unfolding. The result is that a degree of vertical integration
of food businesses exists in Ghana that is not possible in
Ethiopia, where only locals have such opportunities.
While vertical integration is not feasible for Chinese
migrants in Ethiopia, some still manage to operate wholesale
and retail businesses, as the cases of Ms. Tang and Mr. Fu
illustrate. Our research revealed two ways by which this
occurs. The ﬁrst is by using legal modes of investment such
as hotels and restaurants, and then opening a shop therein.
The second is by working with locals (the license is owned
by the local person while the business is owned by the Chinese
side), including contractual marriages to obtain residence and
business permits. The second mode appears to be the most
common. For instance, Mr. Fu (Case 5) operates his live ﬁsh
business through a retailing license owned by his wife. This
arrangement was facilitated by the delala (local broker) who
operates next to his shop. Thus another eﬀect of the regulatory
environment in Ethiopia is that it forces Chinese migrants to
develop business partnerships with Ethiopians that might
not have existed otherwise.(d) Chinese migrants create their own market dynamics
One key characteristic of Chinese businesses in the agri-food
sector in both Ghana and Ethiopia is that they tend to be
small private enterprises. 31 This means that they must rely
entirely on their own resources and cannot fall back on the
deeper pockets of a corporate operation if their business ven-
tures fail. In Ghana, a decline in the market for Chinese foods
caused by the departure of thousands of Chinese migrant
laborers (due to the mining conﬂict in June 2013) presents real
challenges for the future viability of Chinese small farms and
businesses further up the value chain. All businesses conﬁrmed
that their sales and incomes have declined as a result. Links to
on-going Chinese investment—notably construction—are cru-
cial to sustain demand for specialty foods, such as the Chinese
vegetables produced on Tao’s and Wang’s farms proﬁled ear-
lier, and sold at Ms. Tang’s shop.This is what Mohan et al. (2014, p. 83) call an ‘‘ethnic econ-
omy”, whereby businesses target their goods and services
toward a Chinese clientele, including other Chinese ﬁrms. In
Ghana, local people tend not to buy Chinese vegetables, hence
Chinese farms and supermarkets focus on the Chinese market,
as well as other Asians such as Indians and Koreans. Similarly,
the Agricultural TechnologyDemonstration Centre (ATDC) in
Ethiopia sells their meat and vegetables primarily through Ms.
Tang’s shop in Addis, and to Chinese companies operating in
their vicinity. Certain Chinese restaurants have a predomi-
nantly Chinese clientele. As one Chinese restauranteur in Addis
explained, business people like himself are really aiming at the
Chinese market in countries like Ethiopia that have a substan-
tial Chinese population, as local people do not have much pur-
chasing power. However, this is by no means exclusively the
case. Chinese shops in Ethiopia also sell to locals, as do Chinese
farms such as the Joy River Meat Company, and some Chinese
restaurants attract a substantial local clientele. The number of
Chinese restaurants in Accra has grown in recent years to meet
the rising demand of Ghanaian middle and upper classes for
Chinese food (Mohan et al., 2014, p. 84).
On the consumer side, the stereotype that Chinese only like
to buy from Chinese—which was a common complaint of
local food vendors in Ethiopia—does not hold up. While there
are certainly examples of this, we also found many counter-
examples. The owner of a hot pot restaurant in Addis Ababa
explained how he chose produce based on price and quality:
I don't go to a particular place every time. There are many shops. I go to
whichever one has the freshest meat and produce. The prices are all about
the same. If it's not very fresh, we can't use it. For hot pot, everything has to
be fresh, or customers won't come. I don't necessarily buy from Chinese
vendors; most of the shops are run by locals. 32
In Ghana, we found that distance and price are the two key
considerations for Chinese consumers. Among all of the
potential markets for Chinese to buy vegetables, local farms
are the most attractive. Provided with a local farm nearby,
Chinese migrants would buy vegetables there due to the lower
prices. The second best option is the local open market, where
they can possibly buy some Chinese vegetables and meat (beef,
mutton and ﬁsh) at a lower price than they would ﬁnd at Chi-
nese supermarkets. Overall, this contradicts the common
stereotype that Chinese only like to buy from Chinese. At
the same time, it also underscores the diﬃculties faced by Chi-
nese small farmers in Ghana, who face stiﬀ competition both
from other Chinese farmers and from Ghanaian farmers
who can produce the same foods at a lower cost.
(e) Implications for local development
What then are the implications of the Chinese presence in
the food and agricultural sector for development in each coun-
try? In spite of the contrasts between Ghana and Ethiopia, we
found several common themes that have been highlighted
throughout the paper. First, Chinese entrepreneurs are present
mostly as marginal players, despite the media hype. There are
very few Chinese farms in particular, and this appears to be
true for most other African countries as well. While we did
ﬁnd several larger Chinese ﬁrms involved in food sector busi-
nesses, the majority are small-scale.
Second, Chinese food businesses in both countries are creat-
ing economic opportunities, both for themselves and for
locals, and in some cases they are competing more with other
Chinese than with Africans, especially in the restaurant sector.
They are contributing diverse new food products to local mar-
kets, employing local people and generating local tax revenue,
and in this sense, their impacts appear to be positive overall.
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countries—concentrated in the capital cities and large market
centers—has created demand for food products that everyone
is responding to.
These opportunities may expand further—informants from
several large Chinese construction and engineering companies
expressed interest in the investment opportunities in agricul-
ture. Even though such large ﬁrms are not currently central
to the sector, they are nonetheless often the reason that many
Chinese came to Africa in the ﬁrst place, and have been crucial
in creating demand for particular agricultural commodities
and foods, which in turn has generated commercial opportuni-
ties in this sector for both locals and Chinese.7. CONCLUSIONS
Most of the research to date on Chinese agricultural engage-
ment in Africa focuses on agricultural aid, state-level cooper-
ation, and investments by large-scale enterprises. The role ofChinese migrants in the food and farming sector in Africa is
a neglected area. Seen from the perspective of Chinese
migrants in the agri-food sector in Ethiopia and Ghana, the
notion that China is building a new empire in Africa does
not match empirical reality. Most are independent entrepre-
neurs promoting their own interests alone, with no support
from the Chinese state and in many cases, little contact with
it either. For the most part, they are not transferring technol-
ogy, enhancing food security, promoting agricultural develop-
ment, or grabbing land. Their production and marketing
eﬀorts mostly target niche markets, particularly other Chinese.
At the same time, this situation may be partly a function of
the small Chinese presence in the agri-food sector, at least so
far. If one were to examine other sectors where there are large
numbers of migrants (e.g., mining in Ghana) or where state-
owned enterprises predominate (e.g., hydropower), one might
draw diﬀerent conclusions. Every sector is diﬀerent and it is
unwise to make sweeping generalizations about the Chinese
presence on the continent.NOTES1. Interview, Chinese employee of Ethiopian Embassy, Beijing, March
20, 2014.
2. Interview, Chinese employee of Chinese Embassy in Ethiopia,
December 20, 2014.
3. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/15/ghana-deports-chi-
nese-goldminers.
4. Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Africa desk chief: http://www.tianong.cn/
153/view-69698-0-0.html.
5. Examples of these projects can be found in the Declarations and
Programmes published after each of the ﬁve meetings of the Forum on
China–Africa Cooperation: http://www.focac.org/eng/.
6. Since the focus of our research in the agri-food sector was on farms,
shops and other enterprises involved in marketing food and agricultural
products, and these ﬁrms are only growing food for their own staﬀ needs,
we did not visit their facilities.
7. Interview, Ghanaian employee at China Geo-Engineering Corpora-
tion, Accra, December 12th, 2013.
8. For one example of the ‘land grab’ literature pertaining to China, see
GRAIN (2008). For a thorough refutation of the Chinese ‘land grab’
hypothesis, see Bra¨utigam (2015). For an overview of the situation
pertaining to ‘land grab’ in Africa, see Cotula (2013) and Oya (2013).
9. This farm was only located by chance when the author happened to
meet a local man purchasing vegetables at the gate of the Agricultural
Technology Demonstration Centre in Ginchi. The farm was not listed on
the Ethiopian Investment Agency list at the time of research. One of the
authors visited the ﬁrst farm along with a colleague in September 2014.
10. All names in this article are pseudonyms, except David Huang, who
has already been cited in Bra¨utigam and Tang (2012), p. 15.
11. Interview, Chinese farmer, Ethiopia, October 7, 2014.
12. Interview, Chinese company manager, Ghana, December 2, 2013.13. Interview, Chinese restaurant owner, Addis Ababa, November 25,
2013.
14. Ghana’s land laws are fraught with internal tensions, largely due to
the inheritance of the colonial system that deferred control of property
rights to local chiefs (Amanor, 2005).
15. Interview, shopkeeper, Rwanda Market, Addis Ababa, March 20
2014.
16. Interview, shopkeeper, Rwanda Market, Addis Ababa, December 12,
2014.
17. Interview, agro-chemical company employee, Ghana, December 2,
2013.
18. Interview, agro-chemical company employee, Ghana, December 2,
2013.
19. Interview, Chinese manager at Wynca Sunshine Group, Ghana,
December 5, 2013.
20. In Ethiopia, there are two types of marriage arrangements. One is a
full wife and husband arrangement, which implies 50–50 ownership of all
family resources. The second is based on a contract that states what
proportion of family resources are shared. In the case of Mr. Fu, he has a
marriage arrangement which speciﬁes payment of a given amount of
money to his wife, which in this case is paid monthly like a salary. The
delala was paid a one-oﬀ fee for his facilitation of the marriage.
21. Interview, Chinese restaurant owner, Addis Ababa, March 18, 2014.
22. Interview, shopkeeper, Rwanda Market, Addis Ababa, December 12,
2014.
23. Interview, Chinese hotel manager, Addis Ababa, March 17, 2014.
24. Interview, Chinese restaurant owner, Addis Ababa, December 7,
2014.
25. Interview, Chinese farmer, Ghana, December 20, 2013.
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2014.29. Interview, Chinese entrepreneur, Addis Ababa, December 6, 2014.30. Interview, Chinese restaurant owner, Addis Ababa, December 7, 2014.
31. Our research did ﬁnd one large enterprise in Ghana, the Wynca
Sunshine Group. In Ethiopia, we found two Chinese companies which are
either considering or already in the process of investing in the agri-food
sector. However, the majority of cases that we found in both countries
consisted of small enterprises, whether farms, restaurants or retail shops.
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